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in China
Evan Oxhorn*
China is rapidly becoming the world’s largest consumer market. As
the number of middle-class Chinese consumers has grown, so too
has the size of China’s consumer finance system. To date, there has
been little scholarship on consumer finance in China. This article
takes a first step at filling this gap in the literature. It argues that
China’s consumer finance system is fundamentally a tool of the
state, which uses “financial repression” of Chinese consumers to
acquire capital through shadow taxation. This political-legal
system allows reallocation of consumers’ capital for political
purposes and underwrites China’s rapid growth. But cheap
consumer capital has primed the Chinese economy for an economic
collapse by encouraging unsustainable asset bubbles. Ironically,
this very problem makes it impossible for China to liberalize its
consumer finance system, lest a shortage of easy capital precipitate
a collapse. China’s elite are also against financial liberalization
because it is not in their personal interest. Ultimately, meaningful
liberalization of China’s consumer finance system is unlikely
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because change would require the type of political-legal
liberalization which China’s government has been unwilling to
pursue.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2009, one of China’s richest women, twenty-eightyear-old Wu Ying, was sentenced to death.1 Ying received the death
penalty for running an informal finance organization after evidence of
financial improprieties appeared. 2 Commentators speculate that her
1

Is China’s Entrepreneurial Boom at Risk From a Political Crackdown?, THE ECONOMIST
(Apr.
18,
2011),
http://www.economist.com/economistasks/chinas_entrepreneurial_boom_risk_political_crackdown.
Several
associated
individuals also received long sentences. Id.
2
Id.
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spectacular punishment in a country where informal finance is both illegal
and widespread arose from losing money invested by politically connected
individuals or from her lack of investment in political “protection.”3
While Ying’s sentence may have been payback for losing the
wrong people’s money or for failing to pay kickbacks, it also fired a
warning shot at Chinese considering unofficial finance channels. It
appears the supreme penalty was meted out not just as a personal vendetta,
but with the goal of suppressing informal finance. This suppression
protects the supremacy of the official financial channels controlled by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to enhance its power.
This article argues that controlling the consumer finance system is
an important and largely unexamined component of how the CCP
maintains its power.
China’s political-legal structure grants the
government almost total control over the consumer finance system. In
turn, this enables the CCP to redirect consumers’ capital to support its
political programs.4
The importance of the consumer finance system as a means of
steering domestic savings to politically-favored investments represents an
example of what the development economics literature terms “financial
repression,” namely, the use of financial regulation as a means of political
control. Financial repression is used to bolster myriad government
policies enhancing political stability; it forms the foundation of China’s
political economy.
The CCP uses the promise of financial growth to perpetuate its
power. Consequently, it exerts a heavy hand in financial markets to fulfill
this promise. One way it does this is through establishing a set of policies
that incentivize consumer savings while simultaneously adopting policies
limiting investment opportunities. These policies induce citizens to
deposit their savings at state-owned banks.5 State-owned banks use the
3

Xiangyang Tang & Ruoji Tang, Considered Opinion: The Wu Ying Case, ECON.
OBSERVER, Apr. 19, 2011, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/Politics/2011/04/19/199377.shtml.
4
The Chinese Communist Party and the government of China are normatively distinct
entities, but for the purposes of this paper, they will generally be used interchangeably to
refer to China’s leadership.
5
A deposit is functionally a loan to a bank, with the interest rate on the deposit being
equivalent to the interest rate paid on a loan. In free market systems, banks redeploy the
capital accumulated through deposits by investing in projects that they expect to offer a
return greater than the interest rate they pay to the depositors. This is what is known as
“spread” lending, with the spread being the difference between the return on the
investments and the interest rate paid to depositors. China, however, uses its banking
system as a way of directing capital to enterprises chosen by the state based on political
criteria, rather than on market criteria. By encouraging deposits in state-run banks, the
CCP creates a discrete domestic funding source for projects the state—not the market—
chooses to fund. This system’s key advantage is that it is an incredibly cheap funding
source: the CCP controls the interest rates paid to depositors, which it keeps at negative
rates. Depositors actually pay the state-run banks for the privilege of lending the state-run
banks money, money which the banks then use for subsidized lending to state-owned
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deposits to subsidize the government and allied sectors, which creates jobs
and drives GDP. Accordingly, meaningful consumer financial reform is
unlikely because the local government and state-owned enterprises are
heavily dependent on this highly-subsidized captive funding source.
Many of these entities would be unable to attract investment in a free
market system, yet these entities are essential to employment and social
stability.6 Financial repression is also a useful tool in minimizing the
impacts of China’s rapidly mushrooming public debt.7
This article’s examination of the role of the Chinese consumer
finance system in the Chinese political-legal system adds to both the
political and legal literatures on China and to the comparative literature on
consumer finance.8 The current legal literature on the world’s secondlargest economy has so far avoided looking behind the curtain at the legal
and extra-legal norms shaping China’s consumer financial system.9 These
norms indicate that while the Chinese consumer economy is booming and
there is explosive growth of a Chinese “middle class,” China has not
developed the sort of robust consumer finance system that facilitates the
consumption and investment activities typical of the middle classes in
developed nations.10
With a weak world economy, weaning enterprises and local
governments from captive funding created by financial repression would
be an economically perilous endeavor, derailing China’s already slowing
economy. A weakened economy would rupture the social compact
between the CCP and citizens, threatening the CCP’s grip on power by
upsetting social stability. With inflation rampant, a once-in-a-decade
enterprises and local governments. See Trust Belt: Trust Companies are Growing Fast,
Fuelling Fears of Excessive Credit Growth, infra note 33.
6
See Keith Bradsher, China’s Grip on Economy Will Test New Leaders, N.Y. Times, Nov.
9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/asia/state-enterprises-pose-test-forchinas-new-leaders.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing SOEs’ “hammerlock on a long
list of strategic industries” in the context of China’s latest leadership transition, their role
as providers of blue-collar jobs, and the “thorny political issues” that continue to impede
meaningful reform).
7
Cf. Minxin Pei, Are Chinese Banks Hiding the ‘Mother of all Debt Bombs?’, THE
DIPLOMAT, Sept. 10, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/10/are-chinese-banks-hidingthe-mother-of-all-debt-bombs (discussing the “ticking debt bomb” of China’s reliance on
bank credit to fuel its way clear of the global recession, the central government’s extension
of local governments’ deadlines to repay by administrative fiat, and other disturbing
aspects of the shadow banking system, including significant off-balance sheet debt).
8
For example, Reinhart & Rogoff’s survey of financial repression literature includes only
one mention of China—from 1932. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, A Decade
of Debt (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16827, 2011).
9
Other articles mention financial repression in China in passing without exploring the
issue. See e.g., Ken Miller, Coping With China’s Financial Power, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
July/Aug. 2010, at 96–109.
10
That said, because of China’s massive population and rapid GDP growth, there will still
be plenty of opportunities as financial markets expand.
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leadership transition imminent, and an economy starting to slow down,
large-scale reforms are unlikely.
Even if such risky reform was considered, the structural and
cultural norms of China’s political-legal system and its benefits to the
nation are fundamentally incompatible with consumer finance
liberalization. A weak judiciary and corrupt local governments are
unlikely to enforce meaningful modifications because they benefit from
the current system. And like “pork barrel” spending in America,
controlling—and capturing—the flow of consumer capital is a benefit that
elites are loathe to surrender. Despite inefficiencies, the centralized nature
of China’s current system is well-suited to handling an uncertain
economic future. China will not be interested in pursuing large-scale
political liberalization essential for a liberalized consumer finance
environment.
While consumer finance has recently attracted attention as a legal
topic in America, virtually nothing has been written about consumer
finance China, the world's largest consumer market by number of
consumers.11 This article is a first step in that direction.

II. THE CCP USES FINANCIAL REPRESSION TO SECURE ITS
POSITION AND STRENGTHEN CHINA
The CCP’s legitimacy rests on continued economic success. Like
a bicycle that topples over when it moves too slowly, China has pushed
policies to maintain a growth rate above 8% to generate enough economic
opportunities to maintain political stability.12 All national government
financial decisions are consequently based on perpetuating this growth.13

11

For the studies introducing the concept, see EDWARD S. SHAW, FINANCIAL DEEPENING IN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1973), and RONALD I. MCKINNON, MONEY AND CAPITAL IN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (The Brookings Inst. ed. 1973). For a more recent study of this
governmental practice, and associated techniques for eliminating government debt, see
generally Carmen R. Reinhart and M. Belen Sbrancia, The Liquidation of Government
Debt (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16893, 2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2011/res2/pdf/crbs.pdf. See also Carmen M.
Reinhart et al., Financial Repression Redux, FIN. & DEV., June 2011, at 22–26 (discussing
a resurgence of financially-repressive government policies during the recession and
referencing the Reinhart and Sbrancia 2011 NBER paper); The Great Repression, THE
ECONOMIST, June 16, 2011 (discussing the sovereign debt build-up in the economic crisis,
and suggesting financial repression as one possible governmental response).
12
This goal has recently been revised down to 7%. Simon Cox, Pedalling Prosperity, THE
ECONOMIST, May 26, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21555762.
13
Matthew Sweeney, Note, Foreign Direct Investment in India and China: The Creation
of a Balanced Regime in a Globalized Economy, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 232 (2010).
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With such growth, China’s middle class is rapidly expanding.14
These consumers earn enough disposable income to choose whether to
consume today or save their money for later. Financial repression is a
series of political-legal policies that shift the benefits of consumers’
capital from the individual to the state. China has implemented policies to
encourage consumers to save most of their earnings in state-owned
banks. 15 China then redistributes this capital to politically important
projects. Many of the defining characteristics of modern China’s
successful political-economy are underwritten through this redistribution.
Consequently, China is unlikely to abandon the benefits provided by
financial repression without good cause.
A. Financial Repression
Financial repression occurs when a government uses its coercive
power over law, policy, and regulations to siphon private-sector capital
towards government policies. 16 Unlike direct taxation, financial
repression is invisible to most consumers, even though it similarly
decreases their incomes. Financial repression reached its apex in the West
between the 1940’s and 1970’s as nations used it to reduce war debts; it
still remains popular with developing nations.17
A common example of financial repression is an indebted State
pursuing an inflationary monetary policy to reduce the amount of money it
must ultimately repay. Many nations still practice light financial
repression by limiting investment opportunities, requiring pension funds
to purchase government debt, capping interest rates, and regulating crossborder capital flows.18 In its more extreme form, nations seize citizens’
property, reallocate their capital, grant state-owned enterprises monopoly
positions, and subsidize industry with consumer capital.
China uses all of the above methods to operate a highly
financially repressive regime.19 Chinese citizens have few investment
opportunities in-country;20 Chinese citizens are allowed limited access to
14

China’s middle class is predicted to grow to between 600 and 800 million people by
2025. DIANA FARRELL ET AL., FROM ‘MADE IN CHINA’ TO ‘SOLD IN CHINA’: THE RISE OF
THE CHINESE URBAN CONSUMER (McKinsey Global Inst. 2006), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/urbanization/from_made_in_china_to_sol
d_in_china.
15
See infra. text pp. 402–05.
16
Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 8, at 4.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 4–5.
19
Miller, supra note 9, at 96.
20
Cf. Julia Werdiger & Bettina Wassener, Chinese Investors Flock to London to Buy Real
Estate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2010, at B1 (describing the growth of under-the-table
Chinese property purchases abroad as one of the best investments available to wealthy
Chinese).
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overseas investments; 21 interest rates on deposits are low or even
negative; 22 and China tightly regulates capital outflows. 23 Local
governments in China frequently dispossess property to pursue real estate
development,24 capital is constantly reallocated away from consumers and
their choices, and the economy is dominated by consumer-subsidized,
state-owned enterprises.25
B. China Intentionally Creates High Savings Rates
China’s household savings rate is astronomical—up to 29% of
urban household income is saved.26 China uses political-legal tools to
keep the savings rate high in order to provide the government with a large
pool of additional capital to fund political goals. The CCP has created a
society where consumers must possess an independent financial ability to
acquire capital to pay for critical life-events otherwise paid for by the state
in developed nations.
China’s weak social safety net is a principle reason for high
savings. Many Chinese are saving for retirement as the nation begins a
period of rapid graying resulting from the one-child policy.27 The need to
save for retirement affects all Chinese, and is compounded by China’s
brittle social safety net, which requires citizens to pay for healthcare,
unemployment, and disability insurance, and even for primary education.28
Another reason the Chinese save so much is that the government
has created a financial system where middle-class citizens have access to

21

Miller, supra note 9, at 98.
Tom Orlik, Eating Bitterness in China’s Financial System, WALL ST. J. CHINA REALTIME
REPORT (Mar. 18, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/03/18/eating-bitternessin-china%E2%80%99s-financial-system/?KEYWORDS=china+banking.
23
Aileen Wang & Koh Gui Qing, China Sees Pressure From Rising Capital Inflows:
Official, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-chinaeconomy-hot-money-idUSTRE73Q0W720110427.
24
See e.g., Chinese Cabinet Warns Over Eviction of Farmers, XINHUA (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-04/04/content_12272823.htm (discussing abuse
by local governments in forcing the eviction of farmers).
25
There are around 120 such organizations. STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND
ADMIN. COMM’N OF THE STATE COUNCIL [GUOWUYUAN GUOYOU ZICHAN JIANDU GUANLI
WEIYUANHUI], YANG QI MINGLU [LIST OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES],
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html
(listing
117
state-owned
enterprises in late 2012).
26
Marcos Chamon, et al., The Puzzle of China’s Rising Household Saving Rate, VOX (Jan.
18, 2011), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6028.
27
Bob Davis, Chinese Savings Binge to End?, WALL ST. J. CHINA REALTIME REPORT (Feb.
15, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/02/15/chinese-savings-binge-to-end.
28
See generally Juann H. Hung & Rong Qian, Why is China’s Savings Rate So High? A
Comparative Study of Cross-Country Panel Data (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No.
2010-07, 2010).
22
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few safe investments.29 China’s weak financial disclosures and poor rule
of law mean that its stock markets more resemble a casino than a true
market. 30 The lack of transparency, non-existent consumer protection
NGOs, and oppressive censorship prevent investors from getting the
information they need to make rational investments.31 China’s capricious,
corrupt government, weak corporate governance, and lack of transparency
reward get-rich-quick investment strategies based more on timing the
market than on fundamentals. 32 Sensible investors avoid the stock
markets. For the average citizen, options for foreign investment are
limited, local stock markets are risky, unofficial investments can get you
killed, and savings accounts provide a low rate of return. After savings,
therefore, those that can afford it invest in real estate.
Similar to American hedge funds, wealthy Chinese have access to
loosely regulated financial trusts that pursue various investments directly
and offer depositors a higher rate of return.33 But even these investment
vehicles are shut down by the government from time to time.34 At the
same time, the government keeps most investor capital inside China,
restricting overseas investment by individuals to less than $50,000 per
annum. 35 These factors combine to restrict even wealthy consumers’
investment opportunities, while funneling consumer capital toward the
State’s goals.
A shortage of consumer credit further fuels the high savings rate,
forcing Chinese consumers to fund most purchases through savings
instead of credit. Many of China’s rural banks are saddled with bad loans
29

While deposits at state-owned banks are guaranteed by the treasury as “too big to fail,”
deposits at private banks have no such protection. China has long debated the merits of
such a plan, but there are still no concrete plans. In a further sign of the structural
implications of financial repression in China, it is reportedly the state-owned banks which
most oppose deposit insurance. Keith Bradsher, China Pushes Deposit Insurance in Bank
Overhaul,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
13,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/business/global/china-is-said-to-consider-plan-todeal-with-failed-banks.html.
30
See generally Suananda Sen, Finance in China After WTO, 40 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY
565 (2005) (discussing disclosure rules). Xiangyang Huang, It’s Time to Clean Up the
Stock ‘Casino’, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 8, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/201203/08/content_14784047.htm (discussing the casino-like aspects of China’s stock market).
31
See Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 861, 894–95 (2010).
32
Andy Xie, Trapped Inside a Property Bubble: When China’s Real Estate Bubble Finally
Bursts While Exports Become Less Competitive, the Consequences Could be Severe,
CAIXIN ONLINE (Jan. 10, 2010), http://english.caing.com/2010-01-10/100106991.html.
33
Trust Belt: Trust Companies are Growing Fast, Fuelling Fears of Excessive Credit
Growth,
THE
ECONOMIST,
Feb.
10,
2011,
available
at
http://www.economist.com/node/18118975.
34
Cf. Simon Rabinovitch, Chinese Banks Fight for Deposits, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3ba4e690-f7ec-11e0-a41900144feab49a.html#axzz1qXjzMua1.
35
Miller, supra note 9, at 98.
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and unable to access government relief.36 Consequently, they provide
almost no credit to many Chinese.37 Traditionally, China’s consumers and
entrepreneurs have relied on their savings in concert with informal credit
services to finance large purchases. 38 The informal loan industry is
estimated at $2.6 trillion dollars annually.39 The interest rates on informal
loans range from 18% to 200%, and the loans rarely extend past two
years.40 Informal loans are less than ideal, and their high rates are likely
to discourage consumers from tapping into them except in the most
extreme situations. Consequently, Chinese rationally opt for high savings
rates.
As the story of Wu Ying demonstrates, however, these illegal
informal credit networks are being discouraged.41 While the informal
credit system is too vast to be completely quashed, it currently faces
significant pressure, which will hurt consumers in need of capital.42 In
theory, this shift in demand away from informal markets could lead larger
banks to roll out more consumer-focused products, but, as will be
explained below, this is unlikely.
The weakness of China’s credit markets is at least partially
intentional, allowing the CCP to limit the development of independent
power bases.43 China has a robust entrepreneurial system at the local level,
which entrepreneurs can fund through informal means and personal
savings. 44 However, there are very few regional-, and even fewer
36

See Sen, supra note 30. But see China Encourages Rural Bank Development, CHINA
DAILY,
Oct.
22,
2012,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/201210/22/content_15835313.htm (describing the government-promoted expansion of new
rural banks, albeit funded with private capital).
37
Frank Langfitt, Boom in Shadow Financing Exacts High Toll in China, NPR, Oct. 25,
2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141552651/boom-in-shadow-financing-exacts-hightoll-in-china.
38
Is China’s Entrepreneurial Boom at Risk From a Political Crackdown?, THE
ECONOMIST, supra note 1.
39
Sen, supra note 30.
40
See China’s Economy: Bamboo Capitalism, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2011, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/18332610.
41
Is China’s Entrepreneurial Boom at Risk From a Political Crackdown?, THE
ECONOMIST, supra note 1.
42
China has announced recent plans to restrict informal credit even further. Chris Buckley
& Kim Coghill, China’s Wen Sees Progress in Inflation Fight, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/us-china-economy-wenidUSTRE7941F420111005.
43
Credit can be an exponential force in the creation of independent power, because it can
be re-loaned. Well-functioning credit markets display a strong multiplier effect. For
example, Bank A loans to Factory B, which extends a 60-day credit to Retailer C, who
sells a car with “no money down” to Consumer D. As these systems proliferate, the State
loses control over key levers of the economy, especially when a creditor, like Retailer C, is
not part of the State.
44
See Lingling Wei, Small Companies Teeter as Beijing Tightens Lending, WALL ST. J.
(Oct.
1,
2011),
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national-level private firms.45 A robust credit market with limited state
control is necessary for entrepreneurs to expand beyond their local
markets, but these firms could also become private economic forces
capable of threatening the CCP. Perpetuating weak credit markets
maintains firms’ dependence on the CCP for capital, increasing the CCP’s
political supremacy.46
Credit cards represent a bright spot of consumer finance growth in
China. Accounts grew from eleven million in 2004 to one hundred and
twenty-four million in 2008, with an estimated 42% of urban residents
now owning one.47 Credit cards represent a bright spot of consumer
finance growth in China.48 But Chinese consumers approach credit cards
differently from their Western counterparts. In China, just 6% of
transactions are made with credit cards.49 Banks have pursued credit cards
to attract deposit accounts; they understand that they are offering a
convenience service, not a loan.
There are obviously other factors contributing to the high savings
rate not tied directly to financial repression. First, a massive gender
imbalance has emerged as a malignant side-effect of China's one-child
policy, as female fetuses are selectively aborted to ensure that a family’s
"one" child is male.50 To attract a bride, young men—and their families—
are competing fiercely to save enough to attract ever-fewer potential
brides with the lure of a comfortable life.51 Second, modern China's
history of instability encourages liquid savings in case of disaster.52

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204138204576602200899086370.html?g
rcc=88888&mod=WSJ_hpp_sections_world.
45
See id.
46
On the other hand, many argue that the recent financial crisis in America and its
aftermath exemplify the opposite problem. Instead of banks in the hand of the government
as in China, problems arise when government is in the hand of banks. E.g., Kevin Drum,
Capital
City,
MOTHER
JONES
(Jan.–Feb.
2010),
http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/01/wall-street-big-finance-lobbyists.
47
Nin-Hai Tseng, Why China Won’t Charge It, CNN MONEY (Feb. 14, 2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/14/news/international/china_credit_cards.fortune/index.htm.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
See generally Brenda Cronin, Competition for Brides Fuels High China Savings, WALL
S T.
J.
CHINA
REALTIME
REPORT
(Mar.
10,
2011),
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/03/10/competition-for-brides-fuels-high-chinasavings (stating that there are “1.15 pre-marital-age men for every one woman” in China
today, and discussing impact of this on China’s high savings rate).
51
Shang-Jin Wei & Xiaobo Zhang, The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence From Rising
Sex Ratios and Savings Rates in China (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 15093, 2009).
52
In the past hundred years China experienced the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the
Republican Era, the Warlord Era, the Japanese occupation and war, the Nationalist Era, the
Communist revolution, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and finally,
Reform and Opening policies of the past thirty years.
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The effectiveness of China's pro-savings policies become clear
when one realizes that China experiences these astronomical savings rates
despite interest rates that are nearly two points below inflation, meaning
depositors lose 2%—and even 3%—of their deposited capital annually, in
real terms!53 With inflation recently reaching a thirty-two month high,54
these deposits are becoming even less valuable. As will be explained
below, extraordinary savings rates and low interest payments are the
foundation on which China builds its economy. While some of the
reasons for the high savings are outside of the government's control, the
persistence of a weak safety net and limited social services when China
has trillions of dollars in reserves, coupled with poor investor protections,
limited investment opportunities, and inadequate consumer credit, is
consistent with the view that the State actively works to promote high
savings.55
C. State-Owned Banks Subsidize Key National Policies Through
Reallocating the Proceeds of a Shadow Tax on Consumer
Deposits
China's banking sector is dominated by state-owned banks (SOBs),
which control 77% of consumer deposits.56 Unlike America's Federal
Reserve, which only sets target interest rates, the People's Bank of China
(PBC) sets the actual interest rates paid on SOBs' loans and deposits.57
53

See, e.g., Trust Belt: Trust Companies are Growing Fast, Fuelling Fears of Excessive
Credit Growth, supra note 33 (reporting close to a 2% loss on deposits); Rabinovitch,
supra note 34 (reporting the same figure as a 3% loss).
54
Paul Sonne & Laurie Burkitt, China Fines Unilever for Price Comments, WALL ST. J.
(May
7,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703859304576306401272168750.html?m
od=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection.
55
There are a litany of other reasons cited in support of the reserves, including aiding
exporters, controlling inflation, and geopolitical investments. But the importance of
deposits should not be discounted. Essentially, consumers’ negative interest rate deposits
function as a quasi-treasury that the government can use as it sees fit through the stateowned banks without having to raise taxes. At the same time, China has indicated it
intends to strengthen its social safety net during the next five years. KPMG, CHINA’S 12TH
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The PBC has kept both rates extraordinarily low, resulting in an excess of
cheap loans issued by SOBs.58 These low interest rates effectively act as a
shadow tax on Chinese depositors, imposing a negative rate of return on
deposits equivalent to 65% of consumers’ income tax payments.59 SOBs
utilize the low consumer deposit interest rates to subsidize low interest
loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local governments.60
China remains wedded to the benefits derived from low interest
rates on large consumer deposits, despite evidence that consumers would
prefer a banking system designed for their benefit. For example, in early
2011, SOBs demonstrated significant initiative by tapping into this latent
consumer demand.61 In just a few short months, SOBs used regulatory
loopholes to create a hundred billion-dollar market for alternative deposit
instruments offering positive interest rates.62 Despite the benefits of these
instruments for SOBs and consumers, Chinese regulators banned these
products in less than a year.63 The message to SOBs was clear: financial
repression will be maintained, despite consumer demand.
Essentially, the SOBs, the SOEs, and local governments are all
subsidized through consumer deposits.64 To protect SOBs' balance sheets
from losses on their uneconomic loans, the PBC must continue to maintain
its low interest rate policy, perpetuating this misallocation of capital.65
The CCP has every incentive to maintain low interest rates to keep the
bicycle from toppling over. Leftist commentators eagerly awaiting the
rise of China's financial sector to counterbalance what they view as a
malignant Wall Street66 appear oblivious to the fact that China’s financial
sector is built directly on the appropriation of Chinese citizens’ capital.
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The PBC is responsible for maintaining China's exchange rates as
well.
China's currency, the renminbi (“RMB”), is not a freely
convertible currency and is not expected to become convertible in the near
term.68 American manufacturers allege China's currency is undervalued
by 40%. 69 These low exchange rates subsidize China's export
manufacturers by making Chinese goods relatively inexpensive on the
world market.70 China maintains its weak currency by sending hundreds
of billions of dollars, largely from consumer deposits, abroad.71 As a
result of this outflow subsidized by consumer deposits, there is less money
inside China to compensate depositors through interest rates. Consumer
deposits effectively subsidize China's manufacturing and export sector, a
key driver of China's spectacular economic growth.
The independent China Banking Regulatory Commission directly
regulates Chinese banks' compliance with prudential banking
regulations. 72 At the same time, the State Council (China's cabinet)
directs general economic policy through bank lending, and sometimes
directly pushes specific loans to promote political goals. 73 The PBC
oversees implementation of these policies.
This uneconomic approach to lending is a legacy of the SOBs’
original mission of funding government initiatives for purely political—
not economic—reasons. 74 Although SOBs have gained significant
autonomy since the 1980s, there exists conflicting evidence over whether
the banking sector is sufficiently self-interested to ensure its safety.75 For
example, China's Premier, Wen Jiabao, recently ordered banks to accept
more non-performing loans from small and medium entrepreneurs. 76
During the financial crisis, banks responded to similar political requests
by loosening lending.77 And as the recent crackdown on alternate deposit
67
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instruments demonstrates, the State is actively discouraging
entrepreneurial activity by SOBs that may distract them from their prime
purpose of issuing political loans.
The SOBs can survive issuing these non-economic political loans
because they are backed politically and economically by the State. SOBs
have received tens of billions of dollars from the treasury to write off bad
loans to SOEs.78 SOBs also benefit from the political-legal policies that
create large interest spreads on consumer deposits, allowing them to
disburse political loans to state-owned enterprises and local governments
at low rates79 with less concern about repayment.80
State-owned enterprises dominate China’s economy. SOEs are
massive, near-monopolies run by Party members and their cronies to
achieve State goals.81 China's SOEs increasingly pursue funding through
equity markets, but still acquire considerable amounts of cheap capital
from SOBs.82 They also dominate the economy. Fifteen of the twenty
largest companies traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are SOEs.83
Foreign countries complain that China’s policy of creating “national
champions” by subsidizing SOEs through easy capital unfairly distorts
world markets and disrupts international trade.84 These subsidies are paid
for through China's financial repression policies.
The continued weakness of SOB loan portfolios gives loan
officers a strong incentive to lend to politically-backed entities, like SOEs
and local governments, instead of consumers. Just as “no one ever got
fired for buying IBM,” few loan officers ever suffered for lending to an
SOE. As a further example of the uneconomic nature of SOBs, loan
officers lack incentives to pursue politically riskier—but economically
rewarding—loans to private individuals, even when sufficient collateral is
present.85 With loans providing such low government-mandated interest
rates, SOBs can ill afford to lose money from defaults by parties whose
losses are not backed by the State. Until the government lessens financial
repression to make it politically and economically safer for banks to lend
to consumers, SOBs have little financial justification to develop a robust
78
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consumer finance industry. At the same time, an increase in loan interest
rates to compensate for the increased risk of consumer lending would
undermine SOEs’ access to cheap capital (an essential foundation of the
national economy), unless the government deregulated rates or created a
tiered system. Significant consumer financial liberalization is unlikely
where it could undermine politically-influential SOEs.
Most developed and developing nations, including China, have
signed on to the BASEL series of international agreements.86 Basel sets
international standards for banking. BASEL II limits uneconomic loans.
Although some argue that BASEL II’s risk-based capital requirements
prevent uneconomic loans by making such loans too expensive for banks
in terms of the capital that they must hold against such loans, 87 the
effectiveness of such regulations must be questioned due to the billions of
dollars of uneconomic loans China politically forced its banks to issue
during the financial crisis.88
Lending in China decreased throughout 2011, 89 indicating that
China’s SOBs may now be too exposed to bad loans to pursue good risk
or implement reform. One reputable analyst predicted China will
experience a banking crisis by 2013 due to these bad loans and the more
than $1 trillion in other risky loans to government-backed entities issued
off of SOB balance sheets.90 China’s SOBs are aware of the risk, and
claim to have a handle on the situation.91 Similarly, Chinese regulators
are increasing capital adequacy ratios to 11.5% to limit risk,92 with SOBs
actually maintaining higher capital adequacy ratios indicating a defensive
position.93 Regardless of whether China’s banks fail, uneconomic lending
and high capital-adequacy ratios crowd out opportunities for consumer
loans by diminishing the amount of capital available for loans.94
Equally important, China’s success at maintaining strong growth
through two financial crises demonstrates a key benefit of its political
economy: centralized control allows the government to rapidly implement
86
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policies in the face of economic danger.95 In the most recent crisis, China
implemented a “lend first, clean up the mess later” program to escape the
downturn.96 For example, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,
the world’s largest bank, loaned nearly $100 billion to local governments
in the aftermath of the crisis, which now accounts for ten percent of its
loan portfolio.97 Many observers believe the easy, plentiful loans to SOEs
and local governments, subsidized by consumer deposits, allowed China
to maintain its high growth rate.98 The strategy could again be successful
at heading off future crises, and with world markets still unstable, China is
likely to preserve one of the core strengths of its system instead of
liberalizing consumer finance.
Foreign banks will not exert significant pressure to pursue
financial liberalization. Foreign competition for Chinese consumers
emerged in concert with preparations for China’s WTO ascension in
2001.99 The initial reforms focused heavily on governance and the safety
of the banking system by limiting bank exposure to non-performing
loans.100 As is typical in China, however, these regulations were blunted
by weak implementation.101 This resulted in weaker protections with less
pressure for reform on banking competition. In 2009, when profits at
SOBs saw double-digit gains, foreign banks like HSBC saw profits
collapse by as much as 60% in China.102 In the same year, foreign banks’
Chinese market share fell from 2.16% to 1.71%.103 This is due to myriad
subtle regulatory obstructions foreign banks face mixed with external
pressures the banks experienced during the financial crisis. Foreign banks
are too small and burdened by external challenges to create competitive
pressure in the banking sector in the mid-term.104 Therefore, they will not
be a driving force for reform.
China also uses consumer deposits to underwrite foreign aid and
diplomacy. SOBs frequently issue generous below-market loans to
foreign nations—to build a port, for example—on the condition that an
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SOE acquires the construction contract.105 SOBs loaned an estimated $10
billion to developing nations in 2009.106 These loans play a key role in
increasing China’s diplomatic influence as Western nations retrench after
the financial crisis. Often these loans include exclusive mercantilist
access for SOEs to exploit a developing country’s resources—resources
which China then uses to fuel its own economic growth.107
In sum, China’s financial sector is not designed to serve
consumers’ needs. The financial system is a political-legal tool used by
the central government to pursue policies foreign and domestic. The State
uses financial repression to create huge consumer deposits at SOBs.
SOBs then use the artificially large spread on deposits from financially
repressed consumers to pursue State policies. There is little chance of
consumer financial liberalization because it would undermine social
harmony, weaken China’s largest companies and local governments,
disrupt the underpinnings of the export economy, limit China’s ability to
respond to a future financial crisis, and constrain China’s foreign
policy.108 These vast deposits are an easy source of capital for banks in
the face of weak loan portfolios and an uncertain world. Furthermore,
financial repression is preferable to direct taxation because of its subtlety,
which helps maintain social harmony. Until the government finds another
means of addressing all these problems, at a time of less macro-economic
risk, consumer financial reform will be negligible.

III. CONSUMER FINANCIAL REFORM IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH
CHINA’S POLITICAL-LEGAL STRUCTURE
This section explores the incompatibility between China’s
political-legal structure and consumer financial liberalization.
In
communist China, every legal decision is political. Consumer financial
liberalization would be ineffective without broad political-legal reform on
all levels of government to provide space for private economic actors.
The CCP is unlikely to pursue reform because reform would undermine
social harmony while limiting its power. The non-independent judiciary
will be unable to enforce laws without large-scale reforms sufficient to
shift the balance of power between China’s government branches. Local
governments and their leaders are also unlikely to implement reform
because they depend on the status quo for easy capital and government
revenue.
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A. China’s Governmental Structure Makes Reform
Difficult to Implement

The Chinese national government sets broad economic policies
and national goals, but leaves financial regulation to the ministries and
much enforcement to local governments. The consequence of this
relationship is that the consumer financial industry is designed to promote
political goals, export-oriented industrial growth, social stability, and
patronage at the expense of consumers.109 China’s central government has
acknowledged it faces growing challenges and is striving to make some
reforms.110 However, the conflicts of interest and structural limitations to
reform that arise from China’s local judiciary and local governments make
meaningful change unlikely absent a wholesale overhaul.
In China, government actions are not carried out according to the
rule of law when their result conflicts with the CCP’s needs. A vicious
cycle exists wherein these extra-legal government actions beget new
problems requiring new extra-legal solutions. 111 Contrary to popular
belief, however, the CCP is not a monolithic entity.112 It is composed of
various factions ranging from Keynesian capitalists to red Maoists. As a
result, although the rule of law in China is weak, it is not always clear
which faction will be making the arbitrary decision.
No matter which faction is deciding, the principle of preserving a
“harmonious society” runs through almost every decision made by the
national government, although factions may disagree on how best achieve
this principle.113 It appears that China’s leaders believe that the benefits
provided by current financial regulations preserve harmony more than
reform would, further imperiling the prospect of reform. This is in part
because pro-consumer structural changes would lead to severe financial
losses amongst SOBs, SOEs, and local governments, which depend on
consumer capital to fund many of the activities which promote social
harmony.
Liberalization will be avoided because it is volatile,
simultaneously disrupting the economy while limiting government
resources available to maintain social harmony and political repression.
The political changes needed for meaningful liberalization of China’s
consumer finance system, include, inter alia, enhanced property rights,
due process, and a more predictable regulatory state, but require the CCP
109
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to reform China’s politics by limiting its power, something it is unwilling
to do.114
B. China’s Weak Judiciary is Structurally Incapable of
Protecting Citizens’ Property Rights
China’s judiciary is not structurally independent of other state
organs. Judges are removable for displeasing political officials.115 They
are promoted for making politically smart decisions, with judges’ salaries
paid directly out of the local Parties’ general funds.116 The judiciary’s
weakness also comes from inexperienced judges, a poor record
management system for determining property rights, and debtors’ ease of
hiding assets.117
While China’s constitution appears to offer consumers protection,
in reality, constitutionally enumerated rights are generally inadmissible in
court.118 China’s weak judiciary hamstrings lenders from recovering debts
and pursuing financial innovation. The weak judiciary undermines the
prospect of a liberalized consumer finance regime because banks are,
rightfully, unwilling to issue loans to individuals without a practicable
method of vindicating their interests.119 Investors also have difficulty
vindicating their rights through the law.
Developing a truly meaningful consumer finance regime would
require a judicially enforceable makeover of China’s political economy:
corporate transparency and governance would need to be improved; a
degree of judicial independence would be required to enforce contracts
and protect consumers’ rights, especially when a branch of the
government or SOE was party to litigation; government regulators would
need to be bound by stronger notice requirements to allow markets to
114
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reflect fundamentals instead of luck; at a minimum, freedom of the
business and legal press would need to be protected, and bribery and
backroom deals would need to be minimized to create opportunities for
the best companies to succeed.120 The judiciary is not currently strong or
independent enough to ensure that these reforms could be maintained,
even if these reforms were created by statute.
Successful legal reform is, indeed, feasible in modern China.
Over the past decades, China successfully reformed the sliver of its
judiciary and regulations that dealt with foreign businesses, creating the
legal conditions for attracting massive foreign direct investment.121 But
reforming this small slice of China’s judiciary created no political risk for
the CCP because it dealt mainly with foreigners, thus lacking an impact on
the internal harmony of Chinese society.
Consumer financial
liberalization would be different; the CCP will not implement the reforms
necessary for a strong, independent judiciary because such a judiciary
would represent too strong check on the CCP.
C. China’s Local Governments are too Dependent on the Status
Quo to Implement Consumer Financial Reform
Even where the national government adopts liberal consumer
finance policies, they are likely to receive inconsistent enforcement at the
local level. The problems on the central government level pale in
comparison to those on the local level. 122 Local governments are
generally run for political ends with little concern for efficacy.123 This
makes implementing laws and pursuing consumer protection especially
challenging.
Local People’s Congresses (LPCs), the local arm of the CCP,
oversee local governments and are generally composed of low- and midlevel party officials who concurrently serve in local government posts.124
Since LPC representatives are often appointed by the same colleagues
they are supposed to oversee, their oversight is blunted by feelings of
collegiality.125 LPCs can appoint and remove local officials for cause, but
they are extremely limited in their choice of replacement candidates.126
Local powerbrokers set the local government’s agenda with little
120
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opposition, meaning implementation of national reform requires local
buy-in. Absent significant pressure from the national government, it is
unrealistic to believe that LPCs would implement laws that went against
their interest.
The most important reason local governments are unlikely to
implement consumer financial reform is that they depend on financial
repression to underwrite their budgets. As explained above, SOBs funnel
consumer deposits to local governments in the form of state-sanctioned
loans. More directly, local governments seize citizens’ property and use
this cheap capital to underwrite development projects on a terrific scale.
These projects are an essential revenue stream: such property sales were
estimated to compose up to 70% of local government revenues in 2011.127
Reforming China’s political economy to limit reliance on property
sales would hurt consumers, likely forcing local governments to increase
taxes to make up for any revenue shortfall. If the tax increase was large
enough, fast enough, and obvious enough, social harmony could be
wrecked by angry taxpayers. This is especially true if taxes were
increased without legal reform sufficient to protect against future land
seizures. Any policy that could result in decreased social harmony would
be looked on with skepticism by the national government. Unless the
national government offers localities another revenue stream to make up
for the shortfall, local governments cannot meaningfully support an end to
financial repression without undermining social harmony. 128 Without
widespread reform of the structure of local government, there can be no
truly credible consumer protection reform, even if appropriate national
legislation were in place.
D. Reform is Unlikely Because too Many Powerful Individuals
Personally Benefit from the Status Quo
On top of the legitimate structural forces deterring reform, many
officials and elites benefit from the status quo. Unlike the efficiency
arguments for maintaining China’s status quo at the expense of equity, or
127
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the structural complications of reforming state-owned industries, the
judiciary, and local governments, this section argues that powerful people
have strong personal incentives to avoid and subvert reform.
Government corruption is perhaps the biggest roadblock to reform.
Conviction of officials (at all levels of government) for bribery increased
13% in the past decade; nearly ten thousand officials were charged in the
first half of 2010 alone.129 This increase may be due in part to increased
enforcement, and China’s truly vast scale; but for every official convicted,
how many escape prosecution? The bottom line is that instead of
protecting citizens in local financial disputes, officials may accept bribes
to stand up for the moneyed interests.
Recently, LPCs were given some degree of authority to create
“gap-filling” statutory amendments to apply national statutes to local
problems. 130
In this capacity, LPCs would be responsible for
implementing and enforcing many aspects of consumer protection laws.
LPCs are far from democratic, although a multitude of opinions may be
heard.131 Unfortunately, reform-oriented LPC members are deterred by
the very real fear that they may be assaulted or disappeared by local
powerbrokers if they go too far in protecting consumers against powerful
interests.132 Any civic-minded desire to protect the people is balanced
against a desire to protect their own lives, let alone their careers within the
CCP.133
Another significant issue is that local officials are evaluated for
promotion to higher posts largely based upon achieving economic growth
targets. Local officials thus have a personal incentive to subjugate
consumer protection to the needs of immediate industrial growth in order
to advance their careers. 134 Meeting growth targets by redeveloping
dispossessed farmland is far easier than encouraging incremental
economic growth among small businesses.
The CCP also has a personal incentive to use financial repression
to maintain its grip on power. In China, as elsewhere, the rich get richer
while the poor get poorer.135 Well-connected elites continue to prosper,
creating a crucial base of support for the government. 136 Local
powerbrokers and government officials can profit more easily through
repressing consumers than through sustainable economic development
based on consumer financial liberalization and strengthened rule of law.
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Increased wealth also allows the government to increase its investment in
political repression,137 which, in turn, relieves pressure to grant citizens’
rights. The continued use of financial repression is necessary to buy the
support of these elites, while the additional wealth transferred by
repression grants the state more space to consolidate its power.

IV. CHINA MUST MAINTAIN ITS FINANCIAL REPRESSION TO
PREVENT INTERNAL ECONOMIC COLLAPSE
Even if China’s political economy could undertake the massive
political-legal reforms needed for consumer financial liberalization, for
macro-economic reasons, reform in the near-term could be disastrous.
Where many look at China and see unprecedented growth, peeking behind
the curtains of its political-legal structure shows a more precarious
situation. This final section explains that without financial reform,
China—and the world’s—economy is at risk. But for these same reasons,
China must not be too hasty in its reforms.
China has created an unbalanced economy susceptible to shocks
by focusing its energies on growth and repression, instead of investing in
sustainable development.138 China is at risk from a growing real estate
bubble and ballooning, non-performing debts. Maintaining a regime of
financial repression is an effective method for dealing with both of these
problems. While maintaining financial repression is the right choice for
China today, in the long run it exacerbates the same problems it claims to
solve and is incompatible with a modern consumer finance industry.
A. China’s Debt Problem Perpetuates the Need for Financial
Repression
In recent years, China has run up trillions of dollars in debt.139
China could have increasing trouble servicing these debts, despite its
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growing economy.140 This weakness could be undermined rapidly by a
shock to the system, such as from a bursting real estate bubble, resulting
in defaults across China. This may force China to recall its vast foreign
exchange reserves, crippling the world economy. Even if such an extreme
scenario does not occur, the catastrophic risk posed by a debt crisis will
require China to continue to use financial repression to minimize its debts
and provide additional capital, at the expense of consumer financial
reform.
The leading thinkers on financial repression, economists Carmen
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, argue that easing the repayment of
government debt is a principle reason for which nations pursue financial
repression.141 Financial repression allows nations to minimize debt in two
respects. On one side of the ledger, governments can minimize the
amount of debt they must repay through controlling inflation. On the
other side, governments can use methods of shadow-taxation to boost
revenue, providing additional funds for repayment. Financial repression
remains popular with governments because it allows them to effectively
acquire additional capital to repay a decreased amount of debt without
much public awareness or criticism.
Chinese statistics are generally unreliable, but they clearly point to
broad trends.142 In the twenty years since 1990, China’s foreign debt has
increased from a negligible USD $52.5 billion to USD $548.9 billion, an
increase of 1,045%.143 At the same time, China’s domestic debt increased
from USD $93.46 billion in 1990 to at least an officially estimated at USD
$1.66 trillion in 2011, a growth rate of 1,818%.144 Much of this debt is off
of the central government’s books, issued to either local governments or to
SOEs, but backed explicitly by government guarantees to the loan
140
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issuers—SOBs.145 In 2009, total debt was estimated at 60% of GDP.146 In
2011, it was estimated to be between 70–80% of GDP.147 Total loans to
local governments’ financial vehicles are estimated to be between USD
$2.3 and $3.8 trillion.148 These numbers are striking, both for their size
and the velocity at which they are increasing. And as noted above, while
not guaranteed by the government, highly risky underground informal
loans are estimated at USD $2.6 trillion. These numbers become
especially worrisome as investors start to worry about the health of
China’s slowing economy. One analyst has called China the “world’s
most crowded short.”149
China could be facing a “debt bomb,” a globally destructive debtbased collapse explored by Reinhart and Rogoff in their survey, “A
Decade of Debt.”150 Applying their model to China leads to troublesome
conclusions. In what can only be described as a massive Ponzi scheme,
SOBs and local governments have leveraged loans upon loans to buy
over-heated real estate assets. Chinese financial regulations prevent banks
from issuing loans to cover down payments on real estate mortgages.151
To work around this, SOBs seeded loosely-regulated trust companies with
billions of dollars of consumers’ capital.152 These trusts then loaned the
money to financial vehicles created by local governments, which, in turn,
used these loans as down payments to secure much larger mortgages on
development projects financed by the same SOBs.153 The risk from these
145

Simon Rabinovitch, Hidden From Sight, Debt Creeps up in China, REUTERS (July 28,
2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/28/us-china-economy-debt-analysisidUSTRE56Q10920090728.
146
Id.
147
Minxin Pei, China’s Ticking Debt Bomb, CNN GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE (July 5, 2011),
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/05/china%E2%80%99s-ticking-debtbomb.
148
These figures are based on an exchange rate of 6.35 renminbi to the Dollar. Banks are
not allowed to lend directly to local governments for real estate development. Instead,
special financial vehicles are set up to receive the funding. For simplicity, these loans will
be referred to as loans to local governments, because local governments service these loans
through their revenue, and their assets are collateral. Gordon G. Chang, Chinese Banks
Report
Outsize
Profits,
FORBES
(Aug.
27,
2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2011/08/27/chinese-banks-report-outsizedprofits.
149
Shorting China: Panda Bears: Betting Against China is in Vogue, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
8, 2011 (quoting recently-released report by Société Générale), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21531523.
150
Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 8, at 11.
151
China Said to Warn Banks on Risks Tied to Local Government, Property Loans,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-17/chinasaid-to-warn-banks-on-risks-tied-to-local-government-property-loans.html.
152
See id.
153
This kind of land purchase is also usually tied to financial repression, as local
governments frequently confiscate such land from citizens with scant compensation. See
Michael Forsythe & Henry Sanderson, China Debts Dwarf Official Data with Too-Big-to-

422

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7

investments is further exacerbated, because instead of building and then
selling the development projects to generate cash flow, many local
governments instead have further leveraged this already-leveraged land as
collateral to mortgage additional property.154 Chinese regulators recently
put an end to these practices, but there are now billions of dollars of
hyper-leveraged mortgages taken out by revenue-poor local governments
whose properties are susceptible to price shocks.
These loans are becoming very dangerous—local governments
have frequently pledged public infrastructure, like bridges and schools, as
collateral; but the CCP would be unlikely to allow SOBs to seize these
public goods to avoid disrupting social harmony.155 If local governments
cannot service the loans, either the SOBs or the central government will
need to eat the loss. The number of local governments falling behind on
their repayments appears troubling. In Liaoning province, 85% of the one
hundred and eighty-four local governments defaulted on their debt
obligations in 2010, although this Chinese rustbelt province is probably
aberrational.156 Despite the risks, many local governments will continue
to look for methods to sidestep such national regulations.157
In the event of default, the banks could also seize the mortgaged
properties as collateral, if they preserve their value. However, many
experts warn of a major property market crash in China arising from
property speculation linked to financially repressed middle-class
consumers’ limited investment opportunities and local government
development projects. 158 In early 2011, Chinese property developers
composed three of the ten largest “short” positions on Hong Kong’s stock
market.159 At the same time, with inflation rates reaching a three-year
high of around 6.5% in mid-2011,160 the middle-class’s biggest concern
remains a lack of affordable housing.161 The government fears a shortage
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of affordable housing could affect social stability162—yet because of local
governments’ hyper-leveraged positions, national policies aimed at
making housing affordable could bring down the banking system and local
governments by preventing developers from selling their projects at their
projected values. It will be hard to please consumers, SOBs, and local
governments.
The CCP must maintain its financial repression in the face of the
threat of a debt bomb. Financial repression is used to drive up consumer
deposits, the lubricant necessary to keep China’s economy moving
smoothly. These funds capitalize SOBs, SOEs, and local governments.
As these entities face a debt bomb, they need the added boost from
consumer deposits now, more than ever. Consumer deposits present the
government’s best defense against the debt bomb because it allows the
government to recapitalize these entities with little public scrutiny.
Financial reform that benefits consumers will not occur because it would
withdraw support for these already unstable entities at a critical time.
B. China’s Debt Problem: Implications
If China does not handle its debt problem successfully, it could
pull down the world economy. Reinhart and Rogoff analyzed historical
financial collapses to develop a model for “fast and furious” economic
collapses. 163 Applying their research to China proves sobering. The
SOB’s off-the-books debt could spark a “fast and furious” financial
contagion if the Chinese financial system finds itself suddenly awash in
unanticipated risk. This crisis could easily spill beyond China’s
borders.164
Fast and furious contagions first begin with a surprise shock.165
By definition, a surprise shock cannot be predicted. Frequently, however,
the collapse of a key bank or market sector ignites the first sparks. And
China’s markets are starting to appear unsteady.
The second step in a fast and furious contagion comes when the
surprise shock destabilizes an economy characterized by the presence of a
housing bubble and massive foreign capital inflows, causing the surprise
event to spiral out of control.166 Both conditions are present in China. A
162
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substantial number of real estate experts believe China is experiencing a
real estate bubble. 167
Chinese government officials recently
acknowledged that “hot flows” of foreign capital are negatively affecting
the economy, though they plan to curb these influences.168 Although the
total inflows are still relatively small, foreign banks increased their China
exposure 86% in 2010, to their highest levels since record keeping
began.169 The last time rates approached these levels, the Asian Financial
Crisis washed over the continent.170 These investments could be seen as
demonstrating investor confidence in China’s economy.
But the
investments could also come from uncommitted investors chasing quick
growth who plan to withdraw their capital at the first sign of trouble.
Growing inflows also upset China’s attempts to control inflation
and currency prices, destabilizing the larger framework on which its
current export model is built. Consequently, China will continue to
strengthen its banking system through continued subsidization of SOBs
with consumer deposits to cushion against any shocks. These consumer
deposits also provide capital necessary to maintain exchange rates and
battle inflation. Moreover, if past behavior is any indication, any risk of
instability will be met with a tightening of control, not with
liberalization,171 making reform unlikely if China experiences a downturn.
If the banks are sufficiently weakened in the two first stages of a
fast and furious collapse, the third stage of a global contagion could occur.
Reinhart and Rogoff’s model describes situations where affected countries
share a single lender which is forced to retrench when a sudden crisis in
one nation forces it to withdraw capital from third-party nations, pulling
each one down in turn.172 While China’s foreign debt is negligible, a
contagion could spread through the inverse scenario: in the event of a
crisis at home, China may liquidate part of its USD $1.16 trillion holding
of U.S. treasuries,173 unleashing massive turmoil in U.S. markets which
would cascade throughout the world.174
167
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Getting a handle on debt without disrupting social harmony may
explain China’s continued choice of opaque financial repression as the
preferred method for minimizing debt problems.
In conservative
estimates, Chinese officials estimate China experiences approximately
90,000 “mass incidents” every year.175 Public outcry in the United States
was huge in the wake of the bank bailouts. Outcry would likely be even
greater in China if it had to openly bail out its SOBs. Because the CCP
views revolt as its biggest threat, it tries to bury unfavorable facts,176 and
is likely to continue to use consumer deposits and cross-subsidies to
cushion debt exposure instead of opting for outright bailouts. The
negative interest rate on deposits allows China to shrink debt without
raising taxes, and consumers continue to be constrained to capitalize
banks through their savings under the current system.

V. CONCLUSION
China is highly invested in the status quo, for economic and
political reasons. Financial repression is essential to the CCP’s policies
for maintaining social stability, enabling it to remain in power while
allowing the elites (often members of the CCP) to profit. In the face of
China’s growing internal debts and a weak world economy, the CCP will
stick with financial repression to maintain growth, and to shield its
economy. To the extent that some leaders believe consumer financial
reform is a necessary prerequisite for future stability and growth, some
reform may be possible.
It remains unlikely, though, that—with one of China’s most
important leadership transitions in decades still under way—China’s
leaders and institutions will be capable of undertaking serious reforms for
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some time.177 Despite China’s high-level pledges to Treasury Secretary
Geithner in May 2011 to minimize the anti-competitive effects of financial
repression on foreign companies, 178 serious reform remains unlikely
because the revenue generated through financial repression gives the
nation an economic edge at a time when it seeks a larger role on a shifting
world stage. The overwhelming need to maintain economic growth in
order to preserve social harmony indicates China is not interested in
cannibalizing a lucrative, unperceived, and massive revenue stream arising
from the shadow taxation of consumer finance in the near term.179 More
importantly, without the economic boost of inexpensive capital provided
through financial repression, China—and the world—could face grim
economic consequences. Consequently, China will not take the steps
necessary to create a nourishing environment for consumer finance.
Many experts have argued that the growth of capitalism in China
would eventually lead to democratic reform. As this article has shown,
however, capitalism in China is not an independent force working against
the Chinese Communist Party. Instead, it is the CCP’s most important
tool for governing and ensuring continued social harmony.
The
beneficent effects of capitalism envisioned by experts are not derived from
markets ex nihilo—they depend on a liberalized, rights-based version of
consumer financial freedom.
However, consumer financial liberalization is impossible without
serious reform of the political-legal structure. Consumer financial
liberalization empowers citizens with a bundle of economic rights, which
necessarily limit state power. It allows citizens—not the state—to decide
how to allocate capital, and it protects the consequences of those decisions
from government seizure. Once citizens taste these freedoms, they are
likely to demand other rights. A liberalized consumer financial regime
would undermine the political and economic foundations on which
modern China is built. Therefore, even after ignoring all of the economic
factors that argue against consumer financial liberalization, at the end of
the day, liberalization will not occur because the prerequisite reforms to
177
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the political-legal structure are so far beyond the status quo that nothing
short of a top-to-bottom reform of China’s political economy would be
sufficient.

